I send you a message. I now have expectations as to how you will respond based on your interpretation. If your interpretation is acceptable with respect to what I believe the meaning to be, you will respond in a manner consistent with my understanding of acceptable responses to the message. If you do, then I gain evidence for conceptual alignment, successful communication, and successful coordination. If you do not, then I gain evidence against conceptual alignment, successful communication, and successful coordination.

These models and the accompanying theory are a large step beyond the current coordination game framework because it accounts for the dynamic inference character of communication. We are not just reasoning about utterances in isolation, whether it be about their literal meanings or their speaker meanings, but about the ways that these utterances were interpreted by our actual interlocutors.

We can also illustrate the other side of this, where you send me a signal or utter an utterance directed towards me. In this case, I am reasoning about the meaning of your utterance with respect to earlier contextual constraints. These can be built from my last utterance to you, previously established common ground, other joint knowledge such as that which is perceivable in the environment, and other inferences I can make about your goals. All of this can weigh into what I expect you to mean by what you say. If I can find a hypothesis for your meaning consistent with your utterance and with my understanding of the context, then I have found a possible meaning that you are attempting to transmit. If I cannot, then perhaps I need to gain more information and I may probe you for some. Here we can see that utterance understanding is a process, not of game theoretic alignment, but of mutual dynamic inference. Human communication and coordination in general is such a process.